However, this account misses three significant issues. First, a closer examination of the primary sources reveals that Grierson's defense was not as secure as he subsequently reported to his superiors. Second, his survey of the area was not as complete as Grierson and later historians have suggested. Finally, both the Indians and the U.S. Army demonstrated far more flexibility and tactical skill than is generally recognized. Victorio attempted to use a decoy strategy, which had previously confounded the Ninth Cavalry in New Mexico between the fall of 1879 and again in the winter of 1880. That this strategy failed was certainly due to the efforts of Grierson and his forces. In fact, the campaign of July and August 1880 can be likened to sparring between equally matched opponents. In Victorio and Grierson we have two very talented military leaders attempting to maximize their strengths and minimize their weaknesses in order to achieve victory. This conflict was the last major campaign against American Indians in the Trans-Pecos region by the U.S. Army and paved the way for railroad construction and settlement in the region.
3 After his campaign against Victorio, Grierson in early 1881 commented that "a settled feeling of security" would encourage "a rapid and permanent increase of the population and wealth" in the Trans-Pecos. 4 His success ultimately allowed the army to redeploy forces away from the region and by 1885 the Tenth Cavalry was deployed against the Apaches in Arizona.
Victorio led the resistance to the closure of the Chihenne Apache reservation at Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, in May 1877. The closure was part of the Department of the Interior's attempt to concentrate the Apaches onto one reservation at San Carlos in southeastern Arizona. The move forced rival groups into close quarters, and Victorio's followers were soon embroiled in a dispute with the San Carlos Apaches that quickly involved deaths on both sides. Additionally, the Chihennes, having arrived later than the San Carlos, were assigned poor lands. These conditions inspired the Chihennes to flee from San Carlos in September 1877. Upon their beakout, Victorio and most of his following reached Fort Wingate and attempted to negotiate a return to Ojo Caliente. After two years of sporadic skirmishing and attempting to negotiate the permanent return of the Ojo Caliente Reservation to the Chihennes, Victorio finally lost faith with U.S. authorities and went to war in August 1879.
5 The authorities'
3 It is fairly certain that the last Apache attack in the Trans-Pecos was perpetrated by Chiricahua Apaches, led by Nana, when "Bell and Smith, railroad employees; by unknown parties at water-hole between Quitman and Eagle Springs, Tex, about July 8, 1881." List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or Captured, by Indians, &c., in the Department of Texas, since October 1, 1880, officially reported by post commanders, Part 1, Entry 2546, p. 829, RG393 (National Archives; hereafter referred to "NA"). 4 Grierson 's General Orders No.1, Feb. 7, 1881, published in Army and Navy Journal, February 26, 1881, 608. 5 Upon fleeing San Carlos, the Chihennes returned to Ojo Caliente from October 1877 to October 1878, but were forced to leave again after their request to remain was denied by the Department of Interior. 15 He argued that his troops would be better deployed in defending the District of the Pecos. This involved guarding known springs, river crossings, and mountain passes along the Rio Grande borderlands. 16 Grierson was also determined that his troops and mounts not be worn out in similar circumstances to the Ninth Cavalry's experience of campaigning against Victorio between September 1879 and June 1880. 17 His strategy was to prevent the Apaches from moving through the Trans-Pecos region by a process of picket and patrol rather than prolonged pursuit.
Grierson's concerns were not without foundation. By June 1880, Victorio's tactic of targeting his opponent's horses and mules had crippled the operational effectiveness of the Ninth Cavalry, which sustained 34.4 percent of the total number of horses lost by the entire U.S. Army between July 1879 and June 1880. 18 Of those Ninth Cavalry horses that survived, more horses were judged to be unserviceable than serviceable. 19 Grierson was determined not to be drawn into such a fruitless venture on unfamiliar terrain. Moreover, Hatch himself probably provided Grierson with additional grounds for proposing this plan. By June 8, 1880, Hatch predicted that the Apaches would try to reach the Mescalero Apache Reservation by returning through Grierson's District of the Pecos somewhere in the vicinity of Fort Quitman, situated on the Rio Grande approximately sixty miles downstream from El Paso.
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In mid-July, Mexican authorities informed Grierson that federal and state troops were campaigning against Victorio. Grierson mobilized his forces, left his headquarters at Fort Concho, Texas, and established a temporary field headquarters at Eagle Springs. From this point, he intended to direct operations against Victorio should the Apaches attempt to cross the border. Grierson tried to maintain communications with Col. Adolfo J. Valle, who commanded both federal and state troops in Chihuahua. 23 The following morning, having received a small reinforcement from Eagle Springs, Grierson found himself confronted by at least sixty Apache warriors, who were eventually driven off with the arrival of reinforcements from Eagle Springs and Fort Quitman. However the rebuff of the Apaches at Tinaja de las Palmas was less important to the army's ultimate success than the intelligence Grierson received just before this engagement. At their conference at Fort Quitman, Valle informed Grierson of the general whereabouts of the "main body" of the Apaches, and within twenty-four hours, Grierson's own scouting parties had confirmed the location of this group. Grierson probably utilized Pueblo Indian scouts for the reconnaissance, and upon being alerted by the Mexicans of their plans to attack Victorio in mid-July, Grierson sent orders to Eagle Springs that his Pueblo scouts should patrol the Rio Grande in order to detect any crossing by Apaches. 24 Grierson categorically stated that no Apaches managed to get through to the north in the immediate aftermath of the fight at Tinaja de las Palmas. 25 He repeated this statement in early August and mid-September 1880.
26 However, just a day after the battle he sent the following message to Hatch and Col. George P. Buell in the District of New Mexico: I recommend that you send troops to the eastward to the Cornudas and the Wind Mountains to hold San Antonio Springs on the south side of the Wind Mountains and the waters at Cornudas they should fortify the positions and have sufficient rations & forage for other troops to be used if necessary infantry would answer the purpose. It would be well to send Cav to the vicinity of the Sacramentos as from pursuit indications the hostile Indians will go either there or to the Guadalupes I intended to occupy the above named places but have not the troops or transportation to do so I should have two companies of Cav at the Guadalupes.
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These words show that Grierson knew that he had failed to prevent some of the Apaches from moving through the very defenses he had personally guaranteed to Sheridan. This fact was confirmed by three events. First, on July 30 a stagecoach was ambushed and two people killed between Tinaja de las Palmas and Eagle Springs. The remains of the victims were discovered after Grierson returned from his fight at Tinaja de las Palmas to his field headquarters at Eagle Springs.
28 This would certainly have led Grierson to question the effectiveness of his blockade. Grierson was not tempted to send any troops in pursuit of these Apaches; he was not going to be lured into a horse-crippling pursuit. He instead chose to alert his colleagues in New Mexico to the potential threat. The second event was Capt. Thomas C. Lebo's discovery of an Apache camp in the Sierra Diablo on August 1, and his subsequent pursuit of these Apaches north out of the Sierra Diablo towards the Guadalupe Mountains.
29 (Grierson may Victorio's escape at Rattlesnake Springs considerably undermines the traditional impression that Grierson was firmly in control of events during his campaign against Victorio. Grierson had difficulties winning this campaign because Victorio was pursuing an operational strategy that previously worked perfectly against the Ninth Cavalry in New Mexico and came very close to working against Grierson. If this aspect of the campaign is illuminated, this should lead to greater appreciation of the efforts made by Grierson and his forces to win the campaign. In other words, no account of this campaign is complete without an investigation of the stratagems employed by the Victorio and his warriors.
The success of Victorio and the Apaches is all the more impressive considering that the warriors were accompanied by a large number of women and children and transporting loot from their raiding in Chihuahua in June and July. When Victorio was later trapped and killed at Tres Castillos, eighteen women and children were killed and sixty-eight women and children were captured. 35 Apache testimony also records that among the dead lay a number of adolescent boys classed by the Mexicans as warriors who were not old enough to be warriors, but seen as too old to either enslave or assimilate into Mexican society. 36 Such a large group of captured stock, women, and children would be quite vulnerable. If spotted it would be virtually impossible to pass this group through Grierson's defenses to the Mescalero reservation.
To accomplish this goal, Victorio divided his following into two groups. The first consisted of warriors, whose task was to attract the attention of the U.S. Army and draw them into pursuing a group of heavily armed, well-mounted Apaches unencumbered by loot and dependents. Once the army took the bait, the second group, made up of a small number of war-riors, escorted their dependents and plunder ahead of Mexican troops through the area vacated by the U.S. Army and made its way unmolested to the Mescalero reservation.
37 Victorio appears to have employed the same technique when Grierson confronted him in July 1880. He had to get his following past Grierson without the Tenth Cavalry detecting his party's plunder and families. Thus, the events of July 30-the skirmish at Tinaja de las Palmas, and the attack on the stagecoach between that point and Eagle Springs-take on a very different meaning.
The luck of Grierson's small party spotting one of Victorio's scouts at Tinaja de las Palmas is curiously fortuitous considering the ability of indi- vidual Apaches to remain undetected should they so wish. The approximately sixty warriors, had they intended to pass that way, would have had little difficulty in pinning Grierson's small force down, working their way around it from south to north, and then disengaging. However, if Victorio's purpose was to decoy the garrison at Eagle Springs to the west to allow the second group of Apaches to pass through, the prolonged skirmishing with the Tenth Cavalry at Tinaja de las Palmas makes far more sense. This action succeeded in drawing in two companies of cavalry westwards from Eagle Springs and a third company eastwards from Fort Quitman. As noted earlier, the attack upon the stagecoach traveling between Tinaja de las Palmas and Eagle Springs killed two people, yet a third man miraculously escaped, undoubtedly because the Apaches wanted the Tenth Cavalry to react to reports of attacks west of Eagle Springs.
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Victorio's strategy depended on the second group remaining undetected until the leading column drew attention to themselves. Yet when the first group of Apaches attacked at Tinaja de las Palmas, Grierson had already located the second group of Apaches. Thus, on July 29, Colonel Valle's scout reports gave a broad but firsthand indication to Grierson that the main body of the Apaches were to the east roughly opposite Alamo Springs. 39 The broad location was quickly confirmed by Grierson's own scouts on the same day and the exact location, approximately fifty miles to the southeast of Fort Quitman, was pinpointed by his scouts on July 31. 40 In light of this information, Grierson assumed that he had blocked an attempt to pass through his picket lines and that the Apaches had returned to where the main group was camped.
Grierson's assumption that the Apaches returned across the Rio Grande to their main encampment proved erroneous. A small detachment of Texas Rangers joined the campaign from their base at Ysleta, Texas, situated to the northwest of Fort Quitman along the Rio Grande.
41
They arrived at Fort Quitman on August 4 to find the telegraph wire cut, leaving them unable to contact Eagle Springs. They rode on to Tinaja de las Palmas and tracked the Apaches, finding that some of these warriors Once again this appears to be an attempt to draw Grierson westward to allow the second group of Apaches an unimpeded passage north to the New Mexico. The scouting party that encountered the second group of Apaches near Alamo Springs manages to alert Grierson. By the time the telegraph line is cut Grierson is already aware of the approximate location of the second group and has moved east in an attempt to intercept them. 6. August 3-5: The Apaches hold off the scouting party and move to the north and east towards the Van Horn Mountains. Once they have escaped from the patrol, they change their line of march to the northwest and make for Fresno Springs. Here they probably rendezvous with Victorio's party of warriors. Stagecoach employees and Grierson's scout patrol warn the colonel that he has probably been outmaneuvered in sufficient time for him to redeploy his forces and move north. 7. August 5-6: Grierson manages to get his forces to Rattlesnake Springs in advance of Victorio and forces the Apaches to retreat back to the south. Despite losing track of Victorio between August 7 and 11, this maneuver wins the campaign for Grierson as Victorio is forced to return to Mexico with his plunder.
had been responsible for the attack on the stagecoach, which Grierson discovered as he returned to Eagle Springs on July 30. The Rangers continued tracking the Apaches, following the trail to the south, then east to where the Apaches had completely destroyed almost one quarter of a mile of telegraph line near the Eagle Mountains. 42 The comprehensive damage suggests the work of a large body of warriors. This certainly supports the idea that Victorio was trying to attract the attention of Grierson to the west between July 30 and August 4. This group had probably stationed themselves in the Eagle Mountains during this time, which would have allowed them to monitor the activity of the five companies of Tenth Cavalry that Grierson had by then mustered at Eagle Springs.
Grierson was correct in concluding that there was a large Apache group to the southeast, not the west, and he rightly assumed that he should focus his efforts there. Accordingly, he sent out several small scouting parties, fanning them out southwards towards the last known location of the second group of Apaches camped just over the Rio Grande in New Mexico. When the decoy group of Apache warriors cut the telegraph line to the west on August 3 or 4, 1880, Grierson again ignored their efforts to lure him to the west. Scouting reports confirmed that what Grierson thought to be the main group of Apaches had crossed the border. Apaches encountered a small scouting party drawn from several companies of the Tenth Cavalry led by Corp. Asa Weaver at Alamo Springs on August 3.
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The patrol's size notwithstanding, they engaged an estimated 125-150 Apaches in a fifteen mile running fight. 44 The fact that the Apaches tried to evade Weaver's small detachment suggests that there were not many warriors present. If we factor in the broad numbers of women, children, and adolescents later present at Tres Castillos in October 1880, then most of the group Weaver's detachment encountered were probably not warriors. If those Apaches who had engaged Grierson at Tinaja de las Palmas had returned to this group, there would have been more than enough warriors to block Corporal Weaver's pursuit. Indeed, several times during their previous encounters with the Ninth Cavalry in 1879-80, Victorio's warriors, if they had sufficient numbers, were more than willing to stand their ground against relatively large units of troops.
It was standard practice for Apaches, when separating, to set the time and location for rendezvous. Victorio had probably set a number of days to allow sufficient time for the decoy attempt. If everything worked to plan and both groups joined at Fresno Springs, then they had access to a clear line of water sources running north into New Mexico. Even if chased, there would be sufficient warriors to hold off their pursuers. Victorio's warriors were masters of the delaying action, as the Ninth Cavalry could attest from their earlier experiences in New Mexico. They also still had sufficient stocks of ammunition, as the vigorous skirmishing that occurred around Rattlesnake Springs on August 6 attests. Therefore, on balance, an attempt to break through Grierson's defenses was still worth the risk.
Thus, when this group encountered Weaver's scouting party, they knew that it was their responsibility to outmaneuver their enemies. As Weaver turned back to Eagle Springs to alert Grierson, the Apaches were seen heading to the northeast. On receipt of this information, Grierson moved his forces to the east to cut off the Apaches, whom he suspected to be making for Van Horn Wells. Once the second group of Apaches were convinced that they had escaped from Weaver, they turned to the northwest and managed to pass behind Grierson en route to the rendezvous at Fresno Spring. As they crossed the stage line between Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells, an eastbound stagecoach spotted them and beat a hasty retreat to Eagle Springs. When the stagecoach tried the same route later in the day, its passengers found that the Apaches had wrecked another section of the telegraph line between Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells. The Apaches' intent in cutting the telegraph line was to delay for as long as possible the news that they had passed between Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells from reaching Grierson. Nevertheless, one of Grierson's small scouting detachments independently confirmed the information that the Apaches had, for the moment, outmaneuvered the Tenth Cavalry. Then knowing the broad direction the Apaches took, Grierson used the knowledge gathered by the Tenth Cavalry surveys to guess their probable destination. Grierson gathered his troops for a forced march north to Rattlesnake Springs in sufficient time to prevent the majority of Victorio's following from reaching New Mexico and fresh supplies of munitions.
This part of the campaign shows the adaptability of both sides in this campaign in West Texas. When the second group of Apaches realized that they had been discovered, they led their pursuers into believing that they were heading in one direction. Once the immediate pursuit was thrown off, they changed direction and slipped behind Grierson. There was an element of fortune in the discovery of the Apaches by the stage driver, but Grierson's own scouting patrols also confirmed this information in sufficient time for him to react and successfully counter this move. Once he knew that he had been deceived, Grierson did not try to pursue the Apaches; he had seen the results of such practices upon the Ninth Cavalry. He immediately sought to get ahead of the Apaches. Thus, on approaching Rattlesnake Springs around midday of August 6, 1880, Victorio found himself confronted by four companies (B, C, G, & H) of the Tenth Cavalry. Moreover, Grierson had independently sent orders to Company K, Tenth Cavalry, tasking them with scouring these same mountains, and had detached another company from Rattlesnake Springs to scout into the Sierra Diablo. Thus, by the time he confronted Victorio at Rattlesnake Springs, four out of the eight companies of the Tenth Cavalry deployed for this campaign were present. A fifth was within easy recall and the sixth was within a day's march and would join Grierson the following day at Rattlesnake Springs. The Apaches did not have the strength, nor more importantly, the inclination, to force their way through Grierson's forces, as the fight at Rattlesnake Springs clearly demonstrated. An attempt to force their way through the Tenth Cavalry would have almost certainly resulted in unacceptable losses for the Apaches, breaching their most fundamental principle of war: sustaining minimal losses for maximum gain.
At no point during this campaign did Grierson opt to pursue an Apache trail. The lesson Grierson learned from observing the Ninth Cavalry's punishing experience against Victorio in New Mexico was one of the reasons for Grierson's success in July and August 1880. In other words, had Grierson decided to pursue rather than block Victorio, he would have lost the campaign. Grierson undermined Victorio's decoy strategy because Grierson had received clear intelligence of the location of the second and more vulnerable group of Apaches before the first group of warriors tried to tempt the Tenth Cavalry westwards from Eagle Springs. His second attempt to decoy Grierson away from Eagle Springs by cutting the telegraph line was doomed, for Grierson had focused his scouting parties upon what he assumed was the main party of Apaches. One of these scout detachments quickly detected the second group of Apaches shortly after it crossed the Rio Grande.
Upon examination of Grierson's campaign against Victorio, an immediate conclusion is that the colonel's technique of picketing passes, river crossings, and passes was broadly correct. Grierson also deployed a screen of small patrols in an effort to detect Apaches and did his best to maintain effective communication and coordination with Mexican forces. Yet the wisdom of Grierson's strategy can only be fully appreciated if we understand the skill of his opponents. Victorio was trying to outmaneuver him using a very clever decoy stratagem and, when that failed, attempted to draw him into a horse-killing pursuit. Whether Grierson fully appreciated the decoy stratagem is open to question, but he would not allow himself to be deceived into chasing Victorio.
